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Abstract. This paper takes a slightly light-hearted 
look at what defines an ethical researcher, and 
concludes that most of research is done in an 
entirely unethical way.  It shows the way forward 
for such unethical researchers and makes a 
contribution to the field of ICT research, where 
questions about ethics have rarely surfaced, let 
alone been addressed. 
 
1. Introduction 
There is a natural tendency amongst 
researchers to think that ethics only come into 
play when human subjects are involved in the 
research.  Researchers working in the medical 
field, however, would know that the animal 
world immediately places ethical obligations 
on research;  environmental researchers 
likewise have come to understand that the 
environment is something that has to be taken 
into account.  Yet, researchers working in, 
specifically, ICT, would often if not always 
think that their disciplines are somehow 
immune to ethical considerations: there are no 
people involved in the study, the environment 
or the animal world is not affected, so why 
should they submit their research to ethical 
scrutiny or worry about ethical considerations? 
It is a premise of this paper that no research 
can claim immunity from ethical 
considerations, and that all research in one 
way or another, has a bearing on one or more 
of the following: the human world, the animal 
world, and the inanimate world – the planet.  
This connection to one or more of the different 
worlds does not just follow from the claim that 
“all things are connected”, but from the simple 
fact that if research is not connected to one or 
more of the above worlds, then such research 
does not get beyond mumblings of the 
researcher to him or herself.  To illustrate, say 
the researcher develops, in a majestic feat of 
innovative research, a new algorithm for the 
solution of a hitherto intractable problem.   
Where is the connection to any of the worlds?  
If the algorithm is not going to be used in work 
that would yield solutions to problems, then, 
yes, the work and its ethical implications 
would remain in a state of suspended 
animation (where so much of research 
resides).  But if this is really a breakthrough, 
then surely the algorithm will be applied in the 
solution of problems that have previously been 
insoluble.  And these problems, if they 
manifest in none of the mentioned worlds, are 
they then really problems?  Ah, but what about 
purely mathematical problems?  Surely, they 
can be purely intellectual problems, with no 
bearing on any world, here, now or in the 
future?  But that would mean that the world of 
mathematics is disconnected from humans, the 
playing field of the gods, where humans are 
just allowed the occasional off-the-bench 
impact period of play. 
Herring [1] emphasizes the intricate 
connection between research ethics and 
research objectives and methodology. She 
points out that different types of research 
imply differences in the possible relationships 
between researcher and subjects and, 
consequently, in research ethics. 
The following classification of research by 
Bakardjieva and Feenberg [2] illustrates her 
point: 
•  Naturalistic research: the researcher 
wants to disturb the “natural order” of 
the research object as little as possible, 
ideally, not at all. 
•  Participatory research: the researcher 
wants subjects to consciously reflect 
on the research questions and 
contribute to the research. 
•  Consensual/“Understanding” research: 
the 
researcher’s aim is to reconstruct the 
subject’s own view of the world. 
•  Critical research: the researcher puts 
subjects’ performance to a 
test/judgment under certain principles 
(of equity, fairness, ideological 
distortion, etc.). If it is agreed, then, that no research in any 
of the categories given above, can claim 
immunity of having an impact, however 
indirect, on one of the worlds (and to the 
sceptical reader it might be pointed out that he 
or she could, instead of the “worlds” 
mentioned, think about Popper’s three worlds 
if the world of animals and the inanimate 
world do not seem of interest), then the 
question that has to be addressed is about what 
the researcher should do to behave ethically.  
This is taken up next. 
 
2. Ethical norms and guidelines 
Most universities require research proposals of 
masters and doctoral students to be submitted 
to a Faculty Ethics Committee for approval 
before the student is allowed to proceed with 
the research.  Likewise, researchers in general 
would be required to submit their proposals, 
when funding from a research agency is 
concerned, to such scrutiny.  Apart from the 
fact that this leaves open a gap for researchers 
who are “just doing research”, it is a sad fact 
that scrutiny by a committee absolves the 
researcher from any serious considerations 
about the ethical nature of the research or the 
method and methodology employed.  Lip 
service is paid to ethics, and it all just becomes 
a matter of getting the approval of the 
committee.  The committee itself, composed of 
a number of unlucky individuals who serve 
their stint on the committee, would typically 
just apply a number of ethical norms and 
guidelines to proposals submitted to them.   
The researcher or potential researcher, it could 
be said without generalizing too much, does 
not have any serious thought about ethics as 
such, and if questioned, would find it very 
difficult to explain his or her philosophical 
views on ethics.  At most the researcher would 
offer a couple of rules of thumb that have been 
acquired along the way.   
Let us follow this researcher, representing 
quite the majority of researchers, and who 
shall henceforth be called our hypothetical 
researcher. What are these “philosophical 
views on ethics”, and why would they 
influence the ethical behaviour of our 
researcher? 
 
3. Philosophical Views on Ethics 
Generally speaking, there are two prevalent 
philosophical views on ethics: the 
consequentialist view, and the deontologist 
view. 
Consequentialism refers to those ethical 
theories which hold that the consequences of a 
particular action form the basis for any valid 
moral judgment about that action.  In other 
words, the end justifies the means. Thus, a 
morally right action is an action that produces 
good consequences. 
Deontological ethics is an approach that 
focuses on the rightness or wrongness of 
actions themselves, as opposed to the rightness 
or wrongness of the consequences of those 
actions. 
A particular form of consequentialism is 
utilitarianism, propagated in the 19
th century 
by Jeremy Bentham, and by his secretary 
James Mill and James’ son John Stuart Mill.  
Much of our modern society follows, 
unwittingly, a utilitarian approach, the ethical 
doctrine that the moral worth of an action is 
solely determined by its contribution to overall 
utility.  Utility, in simplest terms, refers to the 
greatest good for the greatest number of 
people.  Clearly, a utilitarian argument 
justified the dropping of atomic bombs on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki to end World War II: 
an allied invasion on the Japan mainland, it 
was argued, would have cost many more lives 
overall than the 250,000+ people killed by the 
two bombs. 
The most famous deontological theory of 
ethics is that of the German philosopher 
Immanuel Kant.  The discussion of Kant’s 
deontology is taken from [3]. There are several 
reasons why Kant’s theory of ethics can be 
considered to be deontological. “First, Kant 
argues that to act in the morally right way, 
people must act according to duty. Second, 
Kant argued that it was not the consequences 
of actions that make them right or wrong but 
the motives of the person who carries out the 
action.  Kant's argument that to act in the 
morally right way, one must act from duty 
begins with an argument that the highest good 
must be both good in itself, and good without 
qualification.  Something is 'good in itself' 
when it is intrinsically good, and 'good without 
qualification' when the addition of that thing 
never makes a situation ethically worse. Kant 
then argues that those things that are usually 
thought to be good, such as intelligence, 
perseverance and pleasure, fail to be either 
intrinsically good or good without 
qualification.” Pleasure, for example, is not good without qualification, because when 
people derive pleasure from watching 
someone suffering, this makes the situation 
ethically worse. He concludes that there is 
only one thing that is truly good: a good will. 
The consequences of an act do not 
determine that the actor has a good will, since 
unintended good consequences could follow 
from an act that was actually motivated by a 
desire to cause harm, and similarly, bad 
consequences could follow from a well-
intended act. Instead, Kant claims, “a person 
has a good will when he or she 'acts out of 
respect for the moral law'.  People 'act out of 
respect for the moral law' when they act in 
some way because they have a duty to do so. 
So, the only thing that is truly good in itself is 
a good will, and a good will is only good when 
the willer chooses to do something because it 
is that person's duty. Thus, according to Kant, 
goodness depends on rightness.”[op. cit.] 
What enables us to make moral decisions? 
Kant refers to the capacity which allows us to 
make moral decisions as pure practical reason, 
“which should be contrasted with pure reason 
– the capacity to know; and with mere 
practical reason –which allows us to interact 
with the world in experience. Hypothetical 
imperatives guide action in an instrumental 
way, or in other words, they tell us about 
which means will be best to achieve our ends. 
But hypothetical imperatives do not tell us 
anything about the ends we should choose. On 
the other hand, Kant considers the right to be 
prior to the good. What is right to do cannot be 
determined with reference to anything 
empirical or sensuous; rather, they can only be 
determined by pure practical reason. Reason, 
separate from all empirical experience, is 
capable of determining the principle according 
to which all ends can be determined as moral, 
and it is this fundamental principle of moral 
reason which is known as the categorical 
imperative.” [4] 
Kant gives three formulations of the 
categorical imperative, and we will not pursue 
the successive development of these, but just 
state them: 
First formulation: “Act only according to 
that maxim whereby you can at the same time 
will that it should become a universal law.” 
Second formulation: “Act in such a way 
that you treat humanity, whether in your own 
person or in the person of any other, always at 
the same time as an end and never merely as a 
means to an end.” 
Third formulation: “Therefore, every 
rational being must so act as if he were 
through his maxim always a legislating 
member in the universal kingdom of ends.” 
Another concept that Kant introduces, is 
that of the ‘kingdom of ends’.  This refers to 
the ‘union of different rational beings in a 
system by common laws’. “Since it is through 
laws that consequences are evaluated based on 
their universal validity, he states that we can 
conceive of a systematic whole that includes 
both the rational beings as ends in themselves, 
rather than simply means to other ends, and 
the unique ends which these rational beings 
may aspire to. This systematic whole is the 
kingdom of ends.” [5] 
“People can only belong to the kingdom of 
ends when they give universal laws unto it, 
and are subject to those same laws, and all 
laws within it. Such rational beings must 
regard themselves simultaneously as 
sovereign, when making laws, and as subject, 
when obeying them. Morality exists in the 
action of all universal law which can make the 
kingdom of ends possible.” (op. cit.) 
Given these different philosophical views, 
what view should a researcher adopt?  Is there 
a ‘correct’ view?  Obviously not, and the best 
we can say is that it is more important that the 
researcher should adopt a view, as that this is 
necessarily the ‘right’ view.  What is 
unethical, is to proceed without adopting any 
view, in the sense that the researcher does not 
even know that he or she does not know that 
there are indeed philosophical views. 
To see how our hypothetical researcher is 
affected by all of this, we will assume the 
deontological viewpoint, and apply the third 
formulation of the categorical imperative. 
 
4. The Unethical Researcher 
While many researchers are not aware of this, 
all research requires the researcher to make 
certain choices and assumptions.  These 
pertain to the research approach followed, the 
research method, and the research 
methodology.  Perhaps idiosyncratically, I put 
the ‘method’ level higher than the 
‘methodology’ level, with the latter referring 
to the collection of research data, and the 
former to the way in which the research would 
be conducted, such as case study research, 
action research, modelling and simulation, etc. Clearly, the ethical norms and guidelines 
enforced by ethical committees pertain to the 
methodology level, and for the sake of the 
argument pursued in this paper, we may 
assume that our researcher acts ethically in 
accordance with the rules, norms and 
guidelines. 
The (un)conscious decision about the 
research method that will be followed is tied 
intrinsically to the methodology level, and can 
therefore also be regarded as ethically 
safeguarded.  This leaves us with the research 
approach, which, in the absolute majority of 
cases, is not a conscious decision of the 
researcher but simply an acceptance of the 
status quo – this is how research is done and 
has always been done. 
What are these research assumptions?   
They are assumptions about the nature of the 
things that the researcher will investigate, and 
how the researcher will obtain knowledge 
about these things, and communicate this to 
the scientific world.  When people are directly 
involved in the research (as in the last three 
categories of research given in Section 1), then 
the researcher should also make assumptions 
about the nature of these human beings: do 
they act in a determinist way, or can their 
actions be described as voluntary? 
The assumption referred to above, or at 
least the first two sets of assumptions, are 
called ontological and epistemological 
assumptions, respectively.  It says a lot that 
most researchers would not recognize these 
terms, or, worse still, regard them as merely 
belonging purely to the philosophers of 
science. 
Back to our hypothetical researcher, who 
does not know or care about these assumptions 
and just do research.  Can we apply the third 
formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative 
and argue that this researcher acts unethical? 
Before we undertake this analysis, we 
should first take note of Kant’s distinction 
between perfect duty and imperfect duty when 
considering the duties imposed by the third 
formulation of the categorical imperative. 
 “According to his reasoning [4], we first 
have a perfect duty not to act by maxims that 
result in logical contradictions when we 
attempt to universalize them.  The moral 
proposition A: ‘It is permissible to steal’ would 
result in a contradiction in conceivability: the 
notion of stealing presupposes the existence of 
property, but were A universalized, then there 
could be no property, and so the proposition 
has logically annihilated itself. 
“Second, we have imperfect duty, which is 
the duty to act only by maxims that we would 
desire to be universalized.  Since it depends 
somewhat on the subjective preferences of 
humankind, this duty is not as strong as a 
perfect duty, but it is still morally binding.” 
Interpreting the third formulation of the 
categorical imperative, we can therefore say 
that we ought to act only by maxims which 
would harmonize with a possible kingdom of 
ends. We have perfect duty n o t  t o  a c t  b y  
maxims that create incoherent or impossible 
states of natural affairs when we attempt to 
universalize them, and we have imperfect duty 
not to act by maxims that lead to unstable or 
greatly undesirable states of affairs. 
So, if the maxim of our researcher is ‘do 
research as it has always been done; it is not 
necessary to worry about ontological and 
epistemological assumptions’, then surely we 
can argue that attempts to universalize such a 
maxim would create incoherent or impossible 
states of affairs in research.  Imagine a 
research world where no debate takes place 
about the objects of research, and their true 
nature, and where no considerations are given 
to how new knowledge is created, and what 
the nature of such knowledge is.  But isn’t this 
exactly what happens in the majority of 
research? Hasn’t our premise been that our 
hypothetical researcher is not a lone ranger, 
but indeed a representative of quite a large 
army of researchers? 
Let us be a bit more careful in analysing the 
maxim of our hypothetical researcher.  The 
maxim that there is no need for ontological 
and epistemological assumptions presupposes 
the existence of ontology and epistemology, 
but if the maxim were universalized, then there 
is no ontology or epistemology in research, 
and the maxim annihilates itself. 
So, if our researcher acts ethically, in 
accordance with his perfect duty, then he 
should make ontological and epistemological 
assumptions concerning his research.  He also 
has to act in such a way that he does not create 
a state of affairs in research that could be 
characterized as highly undesirable and 
unstable, by, for example, making derogatory 
remarks about researchers who worry about 
their ontological and epistemological 
assumptions. The ethical researcher thus has an 
obligation to think about his ontology and 
epistemology, and cannot cast this aside as 
inconsequential and of no importance for his 
research.  The kingdom of ends, which is the 
scientific pursuit, demands this perfect duty. 
It is therefore an inescapable conclusion 
that most of researchers behave unethical with 
regard to this important aspect of research, 
however much they do pay attention to the 
superficial aspects of ‘do no evil’.  What 
should they do to redeem themselves? 
 
5. To be an Ethical Researcher 
Clearly, the maxim of our hypothetical 
researcher who has been unmasked as an 
unethical researcher, cannot do.  Let us try out 
a different maxim, such as: ‘Do research with 
a thorough understanding of what research is, 
and make careful ontological and 
epistemological assumptions’. 
For the purposes of this discussion, Kant’s 
‘kingdom of ends’ is here understood to be, as 
mentioned above, the scientific pursuit. This 
‘kingdom’ is a systematic whole of rational 
researchers as ends in themselves, and the 
unique ends – scientific ‘truths’ – that the 
researchers aspire to.  Researchers belong to 
this kingdom of ends when they form 
universal laws for the pursuit of science, and 
regard themselves as subject to those same 
laws and all other laws within the systematic 
whole that is the pursuit of science. 
It now remains to show that the maxim of 
our reformed hypothetical researcher 
harmonizes with the scientific pursuit. 
When research is done with a thorough 
understanding of what research is, it means 
that the researcher understands the 
implications of  ‘making a contribution to 
knowledge in a particular domain of science’ – 
the objective of any research.  This is in 
harmony with the scientific pursuit, which is 
about accumulating knowledge of an ever 
refined nature about topics of interest. 
When ‘making a contribution’ is fully 
understood, the researcher would know how to 
construct a contribution, and not to let it 
happen by accident, which would not qualify 
as doing science.  But fully understanding how 
to construct a contribution means that the 
researcher understood the process of 
epistemology – the construction of knowledge.  
And can the researcher, in the process, escape 
giving account of his or her ontological beliefs 
about the ‘things’ about which he or she 
constructs knowledge?  Not likely, since to 
know how to construct knowledge about 
‘things’, the researcher has to understand the 
‘things’ and their true nature. 
Our reformed researcher could therefore 
change his or her maxim to simply ‘Do 
research with a full understanding of what 
research is’. 
It is a sad indictment of the status of 
research to say that most researchers do not 
live by this maxim.  They do research by 
simply following examples of previous 
research – a process started early on when they 
are led up this garden path by their supervisors 
at the masters and doctoral level, and continue 
with this approach in their own research 
careers, again passing the doctrine on to their 
students.  Sure, there would be the odd one out 
who would stop and proclaim: “What is this?  
What are we doing, and why are we doing it 
like this?”  But the majority just happily 
continue to perpetuate an unethical way of 
doing research. 
It is clear how all of this could be changed: 
introduce courses about research in which the 
research process, as an approach to the 
construction of knowledge, is discussed and 
analysed.  The ‘research methodology’ courses 
that are typically dished up to students simply 
introduce them to descriptive and inferential 
statistics and do not address the essence of 
research.  On the contrary, the focus of such 
courses flies in the face of the essence of what 
research is by pretending to address ‘research’ 
when merely the processing of research data is 
addressed.  Such attempts at introducing 
students to research could best be totally 
discarded, leaving it to the ingenuity of the 
student and supervisor to discover when he or 
she requires assistance with the analysis of 
masses of data: every university offers 
statistical services to researchers and students.  
Instead, research methodology courses 
should be taught as ways of critically thinking 
about the construction of knowledge, not as 
un-involved and ‘objective’ researchers 
dealing with inanimate structures and mere 
data, but as human beings actively creating or 
constructing part of the world others will have 
to live in, and live with. Phillips [6] reminds us 
that “… for the ancient Greeks, there was no 
distinction of any sort between duty towards 
others and duty towards self. Every act 
[compare a research act, today], every deed in ancient Greece was committed by a member of 
its citizenry with a keen mindfulness of its 
impact on everyone else. Each recognized that 
one could not attain personal excellence at the 
expense of others, but only by paving the way 
for them to attain it as well.”  In hard scientific 
terms this does not mean a researcher will not 
do research unless others are capable of the 
same, but it does mean that research is simply 
another act of social (reality) construction, and 
as such cannot take place in isolation (even in 
theory) of the rest of society. 
Our researcher, then, becomes an ethical 
researcher  if he or she believes in making a 
contribution to research, by constructing that 
contribution, and furthermore, if our 
researcher can see that this (contributive) 
knowledge construction cannot be justified if it 
is artificially constructed in isolation of the 
rest of society. An ethical researcher need not 
necessarily be concerned with philosophical 
questions of morality, but he or she does need 
to be aware of what Von Glasersfeld [7] called 
the three presuppositions without which “you 
cannot start any construction.” The researcher, 
as an organism/system that needs to function 
alongside other organisms/systems, needs [a] 
memory, [b] values, and [c] the ability to 
reflect. None of these suppositions are 
realizable to the system without other systems 
being involved. To be true to his or her own 
(constructive) system, a researcher cannot help 
but be intrinsically ethical. 
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